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there are few references in the history of philosophy as famous as the one made by 
Kant in his 1787 Preface to the 2nd edition of The Critique of  Pure Reason, wherein he 
invokes the name of copernicus for the apparent purpose of drawing an analogy to his 
own advances in metaphysics. while reflecting on the landmark contributions of his 
Critique—the displacement of a priori knowledge now de-centered from the thing-in-itself, 
imputing an irreducibility to observer-dependent objectivity, and a general elaboration 
of the transcendental conditions of possibility for the experience of reality—Kant 
references a ‘similar experiment’ made by the father of modern astronomy, nicolaus 
copernicus, when devising his heliocentric model. less frequently noted, however, is 
that among the two passing references made to copernicus, Kant never actually used 
the label ‘copernican revolution’ when drawing his analogy [‘mit den ersten Gedanken 
des Kopernicus’].1 clearly, Kant self-lauded the novelty of his own critical approach to 
metaphysics for, as he put it, ‘proceeding precisely along the same lines of copernicus’ 
primary hypothesis.’2 what remains less evident is what Kant actually meant by this? 
that is to say, if Kant’s claim to the copernican legacy is that of a general methodological 
analogy (i.e. forming counterintuitive hypotheses, severing the derivation of knowledge 
from sensible intuition, accounting for the location of the observer as parallactic to the 
observed object), then (post)Kantian philosophy may very well correctly situate itself 
     1. For a smart analysis of this infrequently noted irony, see norwood Russell Hanson’s short essay, ‘coper-
nicus’ Role in Kant’s Revolution’, Journal of  the History of  Ideas, no. 20, 1959, pp. 274-281.
     2. immanuel Kant, Critique of  Pure Reason, trans. norman Kemp smith, Palgrave Macmillan, new York, 
1929, p. 22.
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within an intellectual lineage that approximates a certain ‘copernicanism’. However, if 
Kant’s analogy is further extended to epistemologically represent a dispensation with all 
non-correlational objectivity, the displacement of any concept of infinity by the absolute 
finitude of experience, and/or a substitution of formal truths with the irreducibility of 
subjective interpretation, then ironically, Kant’s analogy is diametrically opposed to the 
copernican legacy to which he lays claim.  
A subtext to the publication of the newest volume from the urbanomic series, titled 
Collapse V: The Copernican Imperative, is that this anecdote is more than simply an ironic 
footnote in the history of philosophy. indeed, one can add here that, perhaps sympto-
matically, nearly all post-Kantian critical philosophy is mired in a basic contestation 
over the significance of the copernican revolution: for along with so many other ideas 
surreptitiously inherited from The Critique, while the approaches of thinkers as dissimilar 
as Freud and Popper, lacan and Husserl, or laplanche and Meillassoux, have followed 
in Kant’s footsteps by laying claiming to a heritage descending from ‘copernicus’, ‘co-
pernicanism’, or the ‘copernican revolution’, the fact that each system of thought is so 
different from the other only confuses the issue further. As admittingly interesting the 
question is of ‘who lays claim to the Copernican revolution?’, what does laying claim to such a 
legacy even entail? 
For example, as damian veal points out in his editorial introduction to Collapse V, 
the occasional conflation of an intellectual lineage of brute empiricism with coperni-
canism betrays our tendency to continue to propagate what Popper dubbed ‘the Baco-
nian myth’—namely, the belief that scientific inquiry is rooted in observable phenome-
na, simple intuitions, and sense-perceptions, and only from such necessary preliminaries 
can thought proceed towards a theory of reality. the problem with this attribution 
to copernicanism is that copernicus himself insists in his Preface to De Revolutionibus 
(dedicated ‘to Pope Paul iii, Most Holy lord’) that it was precisely the proliferation 
of inconsistencies resulting from the so-called ‘self-evidence’ of the Ptolemaic system 
that required an approach ‘contrary to the impression of the senses’.3 And yet, as any 
high school astronomy student can attest, Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning Human Understand-
ing—a treatise that lauds the copernican model while disparaging ‘those who prefer 
what reason told them over that which sensible experience showed them to the contra-
ry’4—and Kepler’s Astronomia Nova—which provides ‘proofs’ for the copernican model 
by rejecting the inferences drawn from sensible experience—are both placed under the 
general rubric of a modern astronomical lineage that is first and foremost defined as 
copernican.   
the label ‘copernicanism’, it seems, serves less as a signpost for a singular intellec-
tual heritage capable of providing a unanimous description of modern modes of scien-
tific inquiry; neither is its denotation exhausted by the various homologies drawn be-
     3. nicolai copernicus, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, in thomas s. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: 
Planetary Astronomy in the Development of  Western Thought, Harvard university Press, cambridge, 1957, p. 138. 
     4. Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief  World Systems—Ptolemaic and Copernican, trans. stillman 
drake, university of california Press, Berkeley, 1967, p. 328. 
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tween cosmology and ontology, whose basic assertion is that of a de-centered subject 
(e.g. Kant, laplanche, Alva noë, et al’s contestations over the meaning of the equation 
that ‘consciousness is to the mind what the earth is to the solar system’). Rather, today, 
this label functions as the site of a series of competing polemics about the acquisition of 
a proper methodology capable of accounting for the significance of the de-centerment 
of the absolute from the infinity of its universe, or as Alexandre Koyré once put it, ‘[the 
meaning of] the disappearance, from philosophically and scientifically valid concepts, 
of the conception of the world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered whole…and 
its replacement by an indefinite and even infinite universe’.5 
to ask the question, then, of ‘who lays claim to the Copernican revolution?’, may appear 
naïve indeed, insofar as this inquiry itself already begs the question of what even is the co-
pernican revolution? in this respect, Collapse V is commended for refusing the common 
inclination to merely lay claim to a copernican revolution (the subtitle of the book 
wisely substitutes the term ‘revolution’ for ‘imperative’), rather preferring to proceed 
along to the more interesting business of interrogating a point of coincidence amongst 
contemporary claimants of a copernican heritage. For despite the variety of ensuing 
polemics over the meaning of the term ‘copernicanism’—and undoubtedly some of the 
finest contemporary examples of such claims are contained in Collapse V—the common 
theme uniting the volume’s variety is (1) the assumption of a formal method rejecting 
the belief that an experience of reality qua percipio is ineliminable to an understanding of 
reality, combined with (2) an attempt to think ‘the truth’ of ontological de-centerment, 
and (3) the derivation of infinity as its consequence. 
the result is an exciting recommitment to the inaugural moments of modern sci-
ence, an accessible synopsis of some of the most cutting-edge cosmological, philosophi-
cal, and artistic projects of the 21st century, and the continuation of an imperative whose 
well-spring of inspiration is, today more than ever, drawn from that 16th century Polish 
astronomer whose counter-intuitive demonstrations of the orbit of planetary objects 
were ultimately responsible for overturning 1600 years of cosmological truths.
like those rare musical productions in which every note is worthy of its auditory moment 
(e.g. Beethoven’s 9th Symphony (1824), Miles davis’ Kind of  Blue (1959), the Pixies’ Doolittle 
(1989)), the entirety of Collapse V serves to justify its occurrence, several pieces of which 
will be considered below.
the first essay of the volume, contributed by the physicist/cosmologist, carlo Rovel-
li (‘Anaximander’s legacy’), explicitly draws quantum loop theory within the method-
ological legacy of both copernicus, and before him, the Ancient Greek philosopher 
Anaximander, who, by proposing the notion of the floating earth, contradicted a mil-
lennia worth of common sense beliefs in a fixed center to a universal ‘up’ and ‘down’. just 
as the radical conclusions of copernicus’ insights were derived by severing his theory 
from sensible intuition, and just as ‘Anaximander’s willingness to reject observation-
based judgments in favor of mathematical and logical considerations … [resulted in] 
     5. Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, john Hopkins Press, 1957, p. 4.
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the invention of a completely new grammar … in which the idea of absolute direction 
is abolished’, so too does quantum loop theory propose a re-conceptualization of our 
world that, Rovelli argues, promises to be as far reaching in its consequences as that of 
Anaximander and copernicus. this re-conceptualization entails the abolition of our 
traditional conception of time as an independent variable, and its subsequent replace-
ment by a theory of physical relations between variables.
this proposal appears radical indeed, albeit issued in the form of a tentative ques-
tion (‘Is is possible to think a world without time?’) at the end of Rovelli’s essay, only to be 
picked up and discussed in more depth in an interview with physicist, julian Barbour 
(‘the view From nowhen’). Barbour discusses his reworking of Machian kinematics—
its elimination of the newtonian reliance on notions of absolute position, closed dynam-
ical systems, and fixed orientation, among other things—in order to theorize a radical, 
fully relational quantum theory of the universe based on the relative configuration of 
space. For Barbour, just as copernicus’ counterintuitive proposal of a moving earth 
forced us to rethink our entire system of planetary bodies, so also is it the case that an 
elimination of the notions of absolute space and time, inaugurated by einstein’s general 
theory and now unified with quantum mechanics, suggests that we need to dispense 
with our belief that time exists (i.e. our common sense impression of a temporal series of 
unfolding, successive moments that occur in space). 
However, citing a passage from his most recent book, The End of  Time: The Next Revo-
lution in Physics (1999), Barbour’s interviewer points out the irony that while copernicus 
theorized motion where there was previously thought none existed, Barbour’s theory 
purports that ‘[n]ow we must … go further, to a deeper reality in which nothing at all, 
neither heavens nor earth, moves. stillness reigns.’6 in this respect, for Barbour, remain-
ing true to the copernican imperative—e.g. his method of rejecting sensible intuitions 
and the common sense impression of empirical reality in order to hypothesize a coun-
terintuitive, formalized model of the cosmos—involves a rejection of the basic premise 
on which the copernican revolution is founded:  namely, a belief in the motion of plan-
etary objects in time.  
while Collapse V begins by engaging the direct cosmological descendents of a co-
pernican ontology, the inclusion of separate interviews with jack cohen and ian stew-
art (‘Alien science’), and neurophilosopher thomas Metzinger (‘enlightenment 2.0’), 
indicate the editors’ willingness to expand a copernican line of inquiry beyond those 
well-known thinkers—like Kant, Husserl, Freud, et al.—who homologize a de-center-
ment of the earth to the cosmos as what the brain/consciousness is to the subject/self. 
For instance, Metzinger’s ‘self-model theory of subjectivity’ (sMt) involves a rejec-
tion of the substantialist intuition of folk psychology, which understands the self as a 
substance; and yet also contrary to the now somewhat commonplace notion of the self 
as a process, Metzinger forwards a position that is simply more radical, insofar as the 
phenomenal content endemic to the experience of oneself as a self is no more than an 
     6. Collapse V, p. 103, in julian Barbour, The End of  Time: The Next Revolution in Physics, oxford university 
Press, new York, 1999, p. 14 
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hallucinated effect generated by the brain’s transparent, representational processes. As 
Robin Mackay (‘shadows of copernicanism’) observes when considering the work of 
artist conrad shawcross, despite their ostensibly radical insights, even copernicus and 
Kepler in the end fell back on a quasi-Ptolemaic re-centerment of the sun as the center 
of the cosmos. in this respect, the revolutionary consequence of Metzinger’s sMt for 
the history of philosophy—i.e. the fact that there is no such things as a self—takes the radi-
cal implications of the copernican imperative yet a step further by de-centering the subject 
from anything whatsoever.
the final essays of Collapse V—for example, the essays by ian Hamilton Grant (‘Pros-
pects for Post-copernican dogmatism’), Alberto Gualandi (‘errancies of the Human’), 
and Gabriel catren (‘A throw of the Quantum dice will never overturn the coperni-
can Revolution’)—are particularly impressive for their effortless ability to maneuver as 
equally amongst modern and post-modern philosophies (like that of deleuze, Foucault, 
Fichte, Hegel, Heidegger, Kant, schelling, and others), as well as within the paradigms 
forwarded by recent advances in the sciences. 
notably, catren utilizes Quentin Meillassoux’s trenchant analysis of the inherent 
limitations of the Ptolemaic counter-revolution in philosophy, as developed in his book, 
After Finitude (2008), to criticize what catren labels the ‘Kantian’ or ‘transcendental’ in-
terpretative framework of correlationist versions of quantum mechanics. contrary to 
the self-imposed impasse of restricting its pursuit to a description of correlations be-
tween physical systems—a Kantian strategy par excellence, insofar as it’s derived from 
the notion that ‘[one] cannot abstract from the constitutive role that [one’s] measuring 
instruments play in experimental inquiry’7—catren calls for a ‘precritical realism’, ca-
pable of deflecting this aforementioned transcendental tendency. For catren, the true 
legacy of copernicanism above all else entails the further deanthropomorphisation of 
physics, and in this respect, ‘quantum mechanics seems to provide a possible physical so-
lution to [the] transcendental problem … of understanding the constitution of physical 
objects by means of a synthesis of the manifold of sensible (or experimental) intuitions.’8 
it’s only fitting, however, that the last word here should go to the author of The Cri-
tique of  Pure Reason, the most renowned claimant of the copernican legacy and oft-at-
tributed father of correlationism himself, immanuel Kant. Collapse V includes a transla-
tion and introductory essay by philosopher Martin schönfeld (‘the Phoenix of nature: 
Kant and the Big Bounce’) to one of Kant’s little-known early works, titled Universal His-
tory of  Nature and Theory of  the Sky (1755), wherein the young, pre-critical philosopher dis-
cusses the Phoenix of nature (‘the idea that all environmental structures are subject to 
the rule of rise and fall’9). As schönfeld observes, contrary to the common trope amongst 
Kantian scholarship that his early ideas—such as those presented in The Universal His-
tory—are ‘weird’, ‘problematic’, or ‘tough to make scientific sense of ’, rather, Kant’s con-
cept of the Phoenix of nature brilliantly anticipates the recent consensus among propo-
     7. Collapse V, p. 457.
     8. Collapse V, p. 474
     9. Collapse V, p. 368
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nents of today’s dominant and otherwise competing scientific paradigms (such as string 
theory and quantum loop theory) of the validity of the notion that the infinity of the 
cosmos repeatedly cycles according to a Big Bang, a Rip (expansion), a crunch (retrac-
tion), and back again to a Big Bang—hence the notion of ‘the Big Bounce’. 
ironically, then, the contested legacy of copernicanism actually begins with the 
localization of a competing polemic that is perhaps even more intimate to our (post)
Kantian tradition than upon first glance: it is not merely constitutive of the disputes 
between proponents of correlationism and speculative realism (e.g. Meillassoux et al.) 
over whether Kant’s Critique enacted a Ptolemaic counter-revolution to the copernican 
promise of accessing ‘the Great outdoors’; moreover, it does not merely manifest itself 
in the various contestations over whether the advents of modern scientific paradigms 
(whether implicitly or explicitly laying claim to a copernican legacy) involve an exten-
sion, or contrarily, a rejection of the Kantian transcendental framework. Rather, it seems 
that the first dispute over the meaning of the copernican revolution—i.e. the meaning 
of ontological de-centerment, the role of the finitude of experience within the infinity of 
the universe, as well as the procurement of a method by which to formalize the subjectivity 
of  interpretation—actually originated within our most famous and increasingly infamous 
claimant to its legacy, the father of critical philosophy, the inaugural invocator of the 
copernican imperative, immanuel Kant. the significance of laying claim to the co-
pernican imperative may indeed appear a most nebulous task, insofar as our most emi-
nent philosophical claimant in the end could not even agree with himself about its final 
meaning. the virtue of Collapse V is precisely its intimation of where the future of this 
contested legacy is heading. 
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